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CHIPPING AWAY AT THE ILLINOIS BRICK WALL:




For over thirty years, the Supreme Court's decisions in Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois' to deny compensation to indirect purchasers2
harmed by antitrust violations has drawn consistent criticism.3 Illinois
Brick limits private treble damage actions to the antitrust violator's
direct customers, leaving subsequent purchasers who often suffer sub-
stantial harm without a remedy. The well-publicized Microsoft anti-
trust litigation provided a glaring example of the problems with this
rule. Large scale purchasers who suffered considerable harm could
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2013; M.S.T., Pace
University, 2009; B.A., University of Notre Dame, 2007. Many thanks to Professor
Joseph P. Bauer for his assistance in preparing this Note. All errors and mistakes are
my own. Thanks also to my wife and family for their love, patience, and
encouragement.
1 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
2 For simplicity, the terms antitrust violator, manufacturer, and defendant are
used interchangeably to describe the party alleged to have violated antitrust law. The
term direct purchaser describes the party located between the violator and the plain-
tiff. The terms indirect purchaser and plaintiff are used interchangeably to describe
the party denied recovery by Illinois Brick due to its position more than one level
downstream from the violator in the supply chain.
3 See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONs 267-269 (2007) [hereinafter AMC REPORT], available at gov.info.library.unt.
edu/amc/report-recommendation/amcjfind-report.pdf (concluding that the rule
should be repealed and noting that thirty-five states have passed "Illinois Brick repeal-
ers"); 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw I 346d-k (3d ed.
2007, electronic supplement); Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding
Illinois Brick: A Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. CAL. L. REv.
69, 70-71 (2007).
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not recover, while the only parties who could sue refused to do so for
fear of economic retribution.4 In 2007, the Antitrust Modernization
Commission issued its report recommending legislative repeal of Illi-
nois Brick, and most commentators agree that reform is needed, even
if they disagree on how to correct the rule.5 Such sweeping calls for
change have gone unanswered for over three decades, with the
Supreme Court reaffirming Illinois Brick6 and Congress failing to pro-
vide a legislative fix. Making a bad situation worse, many lower courts
deny indirect purchaser actions even where none of the policies ani-
mating Illinois Brick support this result. Rather than add to the chorus
calling for the Illinois Brick wall to come down,7 this Note identifies
circumstances, like those in the Microsoft litigation, in which none of
Illinois Brick's rationales apply. Where this happens, exceptions
should be carved out of the rule to remedy the most egregious harm
caused by denying indirect purchaser recovery. Exceptions currently
receive inconsistent treatment, often accompanied by inadequate or
inaccurate policy considerations. This Note creates a coherent, flexi-
ble approach to identifying and applying exceptions using policy as a
guide, rather than clinging to rigid categories and rules.
Part I begins by identifying deterrence and compensation as the
twin aims of antitrust law before discussing Illinois Brick, which deem-
phasized compensation and elevated other policy concerns. Part II
describes how changes in the antitrust landscape have undermined
most of the policy rationales once supporting Illinois Brick. The weak-
nesses of the rule discussed in Part II bolster the call for exceptions in
Part III. Part III describes a variety of situations in which allowing an
exception promotes antitrust goals more effectively than the rule
itself, and it culminates in an argument for exceptions when the direct
4 See generallyJeff Patterson, Comment, Microsoft Antitrust Litigation: Illinois Brick
Defeats Its Intended Purpose, 5J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 377, 378-82 (2001) (noting
the absence of direct purchasers from court dockets).
5 See generally AMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 266 n.* (noting that a number of
commissioners disagreed with majority's call for repeal of the rule, arguing instead
for preemption of state "repealer" statutes); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison,
Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (arguing for repeal); Richman & Murray, supra note 3, at
100-08 (arguing for a repeal of Illinois Brick, a single cause of action, a "lead plaintiff"
provision, and a simplified damages calculation).
6 See Kansas v. UtiliCorp Utd., Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 204 (1990).
7 See, e.g., Daniel R. Karon, "Your Honor, Tear Down That Illinois Brick Wall!" The
National Movement Toward Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Standing and Consumer justice, 30
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1351 (2004).
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purchaser is unlikely to sue,8 rather than limiting indirect purchaser
suits to cases where the direct purchaser is legally unabV to do so. The
latter approach undermines not only the goals of Illinois Brick, but the
goals of antitrust law generally in a number of cases. While greater
exceptions may not make Illinois Brick ideal, exceptions will do more
to strengthen enforcement, promote deterrence, and compensate vic-
tims than will fruitless attempts to create an ideal rule.'0 Further,
exceptions do not require the Court or Congress to reach consensus
on new normative goals. Exceptions do nothing more than bring Illi-
nois Brick back in line with the normative goals Congress and the
Court already established-goals which they appear unwilling or una-
ble to relinquish in pursuit of an ideal rule.
I. THE POLICY OBJECTIVES OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND ILLINOIS BRICK
A. The Policies of the Sherman Antitrust Act:
Deterrence and Compensation
With the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act, Congress created
a vigorous dual enforcement regime designed to deter anticompeti-
tive behavior by subjecting violators to both government prosecu-
tion" and private treble-damage actions.' 2 Vigorous enforcement was
needed to combat the substantial harm trusts caused.' 3 Responding
to public sentiment, eliminating this harm was Congress's central goal
in passing the Sherman Act. Indeed, when the Sherman Act was
passed, "[t]he general disposition of the public was not in doubt....
The kind of remedy that the public desired was also clear enough: it
wanted a law to destroy the power of the trusts." 14 Recognizing that
scarce prosecutorial resources would not be sufficient to accomplish
this ambitious task, Congress enlisted the help of "private attorneys
8 See Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1145-46 (9th Cir.
2003) ("[I]ndirect purchasers can sue for damages if there is no realistic possibility
that the direct purchaser will sue its supplier over the antitrust violation.").
9 See generally infra Part II (discussing bars on direct purchaser suits that many
courts have erected).
10 See infra Part I.
11 See 15 U.S.C. § 1-2 (2006) (establishing criminal penalties of up to $1 million
and ten years imprisonment for individuals and up to $100 million for corporations).
12 15 U.S.C. § 15 (allowing private victims to seek an amount three times the
injury they suffered).
13 See William L. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U.
CHI. L. REv. 221, 222-35 (1956) (describing the harm caused by trusts to many areas
of society).
14 Id. at 235.
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general"15 to ensure effective deterrence. 16 Using remarkably broad
language, Congress authorized private treble damage actions17 by
"any person" harmed "by reason of anything forbidden by the antitrust
laws."18 In sum, private enforcement was designed to "deter violators
and deprive them of the fruits of their illegal actions, and provide
ample compensation to the victims of antitrust violations."' 9 Private
enforcers were seen as uniquely situated to ensure compliance with
antitrust laws,20 and their license was commensurate with this
position.
In addition to deterring violations, Congress also reasoned that
since private parties-mostly consumers and small competitors21-
bear the brunt of antitrust violations, sound policy requires compensa-
tion.22 As one congressman described it, the Clayton Act is praisewor-
thy for "open [ing] the doors ofjustice to every man, whenever he may
be injured by those who violate antitrust laws, and giv[ing] the injured
party ample damages for the wrong suffered."23 Thus, "ensuring rec-
ompense for injured parties" and deterring violations stand as the
"twin antitrust goals."24
15 See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972).
16 See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement: Raising the
Barriers for Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U. Prrr. L. REV. 437, 437-38 (2001) (dis-
cussing the importance of deterrence to the antitrust framework).
17 Treble damages and attorney fees were originally brought under the Sherman
Act. Now they are authorized by the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 ("[A]ny person
who shall be injured ... by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws ... shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.").
18 Id. (emphasis added).
19 Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).
20 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have
Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick,
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 602, 609-10 (1979) (recognizing that through contact with viola-
tors, private parties-particularly direct purchasers-have access to information and
are acutely aware of the harm).
21 See HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 226-29 (1955) (arguing
that "[t]here can be no doubt that the Congress felt that the ultimate beneficiary in
this whole process was the consumer.").
22 See Bauer, supra note 16, at 438.
23 51 CONG. REc. 9073 (1914) (statement of Rep. Edwin Webb).
24 See Kansas v. UtiliCorp Utd., Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 226 (1990) (White, J., dissent-
ing). Justice White wrote for the majority in Illinois Brick. See also Landes & Posner,
supra note 20, at 605 (recognizing the two goals of antitrust law).
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B. The Policies of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick
In Illinois Brich, the two goals of private enforcement arguably
came into conflict.25 The plaintiff filed a treble damage action under
the Clayton Act, alleging that manufacturers of concrete bricks con-
spired to fix prices, causing the plaintiffs suppliers to pay higher
prices, which in turn harmed the plaintiffs when this overcharge was
passed on to them.2 6 On its face, the plaintiffs claim appeared to fall
within the Clayton Act. 2 7 The Court, however, ruled in the defen-
dant's favor, holding that "direct purchasers [are] injured to the full
extent of the overcharge paid by them."28 This is so even if the direct
purchaser passed the entire overcharge on to subsequent customers.
Consequently, direct purchasers reap a windfall (if they sue and pre-
vail) while the plaintiffs, regardless of the extent of their injury, go
uncompensated.
1. Hanover Shoe
To understand the Court's reasoning one must look to its deci-
sion nine years earlier in Hanover Shoe.29 There, the defendants
claimed that the plaintiff, a direct purchaser, had passed on any over-
charge it paid to downstream purchasers, and therefore the plaintiff
25 See Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 608-09 (noting that the Court properly
choose deterrence).
26 111. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1977). Price fixing violates Sher-
man Act § 1, which prohibits any "contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy in
restraint of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
27 See 15 U.S.C. § 15. There is no doubt that the defendant violated antitrust law.
See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (finding
horizontal price fixing to be illegal per se under Sherman § 1). In Blue Shield of Va. v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1982), the Court wrote, "Consistent with the Con-
gressional purpose, we have refused to engraft artificial limitations on the [Clayton]
§ 4 remedy.... [W]e have applied § 4 in accordance with its plain language and its
broad remedial and deterrent objectives." Illinois Brick is anything but a plain reading
of the statute. RICO statutes create a nearly identical private cause of action. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006) ("Any person injured in his business or property by reason
of a violation of [anything forbidden by § 1962] may sue therefor . . . and shall
recover threefold ... damages ... and ... a reasonable attorney's fee."). In 2008, the
Court rejected a defendant's argument that "indirect victims" of fraud should be
barred from suing under the statute using language that is quite difficult to reconcile
with the indirect purchaser rule in Illinois Brick. See Bridge v. Phoenix. Bond &
Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 649 (2008) ("The statute provides a right of action to '[a]ny
person' injured by the violation, suggesting a breadth of coverage not easily recon-
ciled with an implicit requirement [of directness]._..-_.").
28 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.
29 Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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suffered no injury. 0 The Court rejected this "passing-on" defense,3'
reasoning that a contrary holding would undermine deterrence by
leaving private enforcement to indirect purchasers, who "would have
only a tiny stake in the lawsuit and hence little incentive to sue."32
Consequently, if the defense were effective, antitrust violators "would
retain the fruits of their illegality."3 3 As an alternative, the Court sim-
ply decided to grant direct purchasers the entire award, acknowledg-
ing that this may be a windfall. 34 The Court rested "on the judgment
that the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by concentrat-
ing the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers rather
than by allowing every plaintiff potentially affected by the overcharge
to sue only for the amount it could show was absorbed by it."36
Requiring apportionment calculations to demonstrate the share of
harm borne by the direct purchaser as opposed to subsequent indirect
purchasers was not only expensive, it also decreased the direct pur-
chaser's award, thereby diminishing its incentive to sue. Conse-
quently, private enforcement would be left in the hands of poorly-
motivated and difficult-to-coordinate indirect purchasers.
Hanover Shoe also reflected "an unwillingness to complicate
treble-damages actions with attempts to trace the effects of the over-
charge on the purchaser's prices, sales, costs, and profits, and of show-
ing that these variables would have behaved differently without the
overcharge."3 6 Not only would it be difficult for courts to examine the
complex economic calculations involved in determining how much an
overcharge increased prices, given the number of variables, it may be
impossible to determine damages.37 Even if the entire increase in
price was passed on, the direct purchaser may suffer harm from
decreased sales. Determining price elasticity and weighing the other
factors involved in calculating the net effect on profits caused by the
price increase of a single input is indeed a daunting task. In any
30 Id. at 487-88.
31 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 724. 1 rely on Illinois Brick's interpretation of Hanover Shoe
because it is accurate and became binding after Illinois Brick.
32 Id. at 725-26. Consumers, for example, are unlikely to sue over a fifty cent
overcharge included in the price of a pair of shoes.
33 Id. at 725.
34 See id. at 746 (automatically providing the full damage award to the direct
purchaser).
35 Id. at 734-35.
36 Id. at 725 (citing Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp, 392 U.S. 481,
492-93 (1968)).
37 See id. at 737; see also Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493 ("[E]stablishing the applica-
bility of the passing-on defense would ... normally prove insurmountable.").
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event, defendants would rarely carry their burden, making the
increased litigation costs largely wasteful.38
2. Illinois Brick
In Illinois Brick, rather than facing an antitrust violator seeking to
reduce its liability by asserting defensive passing-on, the Court
addressed an indirect purchaser attempting to recover by proving
overcharges had been passed-on.39 The Court first asked whether vic-
tims could use a damage theory to recover (known offensive passing-
on) even if defendants were barred by Hanover Shoe from using the
same theory to limit liability (known as defensive passing-on). The
Court saw two problems with allowing "asymmetrical" passing-on.
First, such a rule would "create a serious risk of multiple liability for
defendants." 40 Without a passing-on defense, the direct purchaser
would collect an undiluted damage award for the entire injury. If suc-
cessful, a subsequent indirect purchaser would necessarily collect
damages above the amount of the overcharge-trebled. The Court
was "unwilling to 'open the door to duplicative recoveries' under
[Clayton §] 4."41 Second, even if procedural devices could prevent
duplicative recovery, "[t] he principal basis for the decision in Hanover
Shoe was the Court's perception of the uncertainties and difficulties in
analyzing price and output decisions ... [and] the costs to the judicial
system and the efficient enforcement of the antitrust laws of attempt-
ing to reconstruct those decisions in the courtroom."42 That a victim
was advancing the theory made the underlying calculations no less
"insurmountable."
Several amicus curiae argued that compensation and efforts to
deprive the direct purchaser of the fruits of its illegal acts justified
asymmetrical treatment of passing-on theories. In response to the lat-
ter concern, relating primarily to deterrence, the Court noted that
"from the deterrence standpoint, it is irrelevant to whom damages are
paid, so long as someone redresses the violation."43 Further, the
Court noted an important rationale from Hanover Shoe, where it recog-
nized that "the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by con-
centrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers
38 See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 745.
39 See id. at 727.
40 Id. at 730.
41 Id. at 731 (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 264
(1972)).
42 Id. at 731-32.
43 Id. at 760 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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rather than by allowing every plaintiff potentially affected by the over-
charge to sue only for the amount it could show was absorbed by it."44
This is only partially responsive to the amicus curiae's concern
about depriving violators of the fruits of their illegal activity, and it is
wholly unresponsive to concerns about compensation. The plaintiffs
did not dispute the quoted language. They argued instead that even
if direct purchasers are more likely to deprive violators of the fruits of
their acts, allowing indirect purchasers to sue as well would deprive
violators of the fruits of their acts when the better enforcer chose not
to sue. This would fill a potential gap in deterrence. The Court's
quoted language addresses concerns about diluting the better
enforcer's award,4 5 which arise only if the defendant is allowed to
reduce the direct purchaser's award by the amount of the indirect
purchaser's award.46 This, of course, is not asymmetrical at all as it
implies that both parties are allowed to use passing-on theories, and
more importantly, it is not what the plaintiffs were arguing. Thus, the
Court inexplicably rejected asymmetrical passing-on because of a con-
cern that is only raised if passing on is symmetrical.
Logically, asymmetry would actually promote deterrence. By
denying defensive passing-on, thus allowing the direct purchaser to
collect an undiluted award, the deterrent benefit of Hanover Shoe is
secured. By asymmetrically accepting offensive passing-on, indirect
purchasers would collect additional awards, giving them an incentive
to sue without diminishing the direct purchaser's incentive. Rejecting
asymmetry takes away the indirect purchaser's incentive to enforce
altogether while doing nothing to affect the direct purchaser's incen-
tive, reducing overall deterrence.47
The Court followed its confusing treatment of deterrence by sim-
ply ignoring compensation, never refuting the plaintiffs claim that
asymmetry was necessary to ensure compensation, without which indi-
rect purchasers suffer harm but have no remedy. Indeed, truly asym-
metrical treatment would better compensate victims by allowing direct
44 Id. at 734-35 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
45 In at least some cases, the indirect purchaser is the better enforcer. See id. at
746 ("[D]irect purchasers sometimes may refrain from bringing a treble-damage suit
for fear of disrupting relations with their suppliers.").
46 Dilution was a far greater concern in the defensive context. See Hanover Shoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968) ("[I]t is not unlikely that if
the existence of the defense is generally confirmed, antitrust defendants will fre-
quently seek to establish its applicability."). Offensive passing-on will dilute an award
far less frequently. See id. at 494 (noting that indirect purchasers "would have only a
tiny stake in a lawsuit and little interest in attempting a class action").
47 See id at 494. Offensive passing-on could conceivably allow every plaintiff to
simply collect the full award, which would avoid complicated passing-on litigation.
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and indirect purchasers to recover for the harms they suffer. Thus,
asymmetry better serves the twin aims antitrust law by compensating
more victims and adding indirect purchasers as private enforcers with-
out diluting the direct purchaser's incentive to sue.
The cost of asymmetry would be duplicative liability, which the
Court refused to accept. In defense of its decision to elevate this con-
cern above the twin aims of antitrust law, the Court offered only a
perfunctory footnote, 48 while placing its flawed argument about deter-
rence in the body of its decision. Faced with a choice of which party
to leave worse off, the uncompensated indirect purchaser or the
doubly-liable antitrust violator, the Court opted to protect the anti-
trust violator. This even though the Court acknowledged in Hanover
Shoe that indirect purchaser suits, and hence duplicative liability,
would be rare.
Limited by its insistence on symmetry, the Court opted to bar all
passing-on theories, offensive and defensive alike. First and foremost,
the Court was worried that passing-on theories would "transform
treble-damages actions into massive efforts to apportion the recovery
among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of the
overcharge . . . [leading to] massive multiparty litigations involving
many levels of distribution and including large classes . . . ." 49The
Court overstated this concern,5 0 which in any event is far less compel-
ling when raised in order to allow an antitrust violator to profit from
its crime (as in Illinois Brick) than when it is raised to deprive such a
violator of its illegal profits (as in Hanover Shoe). Moreover, it is ques-
tionable how difficult the damage calculations would truly be.5 1 Nev-
48 Faced with an argument that "it is better for a defendant to pay sixfold or more
damages than for an injured party go uncompensated," the Court simply said, "We
reject this." Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 730, 731 n.11. This makes the plaintiffs claims less
palatable than necessary. Six-fold damages would not occur under the form of offen-
sive passing-on mentioned in above. With offensive passing-on, the damages would
likely be the three-fold award authorized by Congress for the direct purchaser, adding
only the portion of this amount that the indirect purchasers could prove was passed to
them.
49 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 737, 740. It is worth noting that this cuts against offensive
passing-on, but the Court could have opted for allowing full recovery by both direct
and indirect purchasers. This would increase the risk of duplicative recovery,
however.
50 See supra note 46. The same argument applies here. Changes in class action
procedures do make indirect purchaser actions more likely, but to the extent that this
undermines my argument, it equally undermines one of the primary bases for Hano-
ver Shoe. Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494.
51 See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENCAMP, supra note 3, 1 346k (describing simpler
apportionment mechanisms).
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ertheless, allowing all passing-on theories would undoubtedly
complicate antitrust litigation.
Again accepting that the Court was bound to find a symmetrical
outcome, rejecting passing-on theories was supported by all the rea-
sons stated in Hanover Shoe. Principally, the Court was concerned that
passing-on would dilute the direct purchaser's incentive to sue
thereby decreasing deterrence. Bound by symmetry, this conclusion is
probably correct though it is by no means undisputed.5 2 Direct pur-
chasers not only suffer the most harm in an average antitrust case,
they also interact regularly with the violator. This superior incentive
and access generally makes them better private enforcers, but if they
were required to prove the portion of the overcharge they did not
pass on, their award would shrink and the difficulty of obtaining that
award would increase substantially. This would likely decrease deter-
rence, though it is possible that indirect purchaser suits would make
up for any decrease.
Additionally, Hanover Shoe rejected a passing-on theory. Thus,
stare decisis, which "weigh [s] heavily in the area of statutory construc-
tion,"53 may have been compelling by itself.5 4 As for compensation,
the Court recognized its importance,'5 5 though it refused "to carry the
compensation principle to its logical extreme by attempting to allo-
cate damages among" all injured parties.5 6 Questionable as it is, Illi-
nois Brick remains good law, and there are at least some plausible
policy reasons to support the rule. This discussion merely highlights
the weakness of these rationales, making a stronger case for excep-
tions where it is clear that the rationales completely disappear.
52 Compare Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at 605 (assuming the Court in Illinois
Brick was faced with a choice of deterrence or compensation, and defending the rule
as an effective way to promote the former), with Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A.
Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA.
L. REv. 269, 351-52 (1979) (arguing that direct purchasers would pass-on most of the
overcharge and prefer stable relationships with suppliers rather than suing where they
suffered little harm); see also AMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 273 ("The record before
the Commission was mixed on whether the deterrence of antitrust violations is best
achieved by limiting recoveries to direct purchasers or permitting indirect purchasers
to sue as well.").
53 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 736.
54 See id.
55 See id. at 746.
56 The Court's decision falls far short of the logical extreme. The only way to do
less would be to compensate no one. In any event, few parties would be denied com-
pensation given that few indirect purchasers would sue. See id. at 747. Why the Court
used this fact to assuage fears of under-compensation but not to assuage fears of
duplicative liability is never explained.
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II. How MODERN DEVELOPMENTS HAVE UNDERMINED
THE POLICIES OF ILLINOIS BRICK
Far from strengthening Illinois Brick, modem developments make
the rule even less defensible. An anti-enforcement trend combined
with state "Illinois Brick-repealer" statutes amplify the shortcomings of
the rule and implicate the very policy concerns the rule sought to
avoid. Against a backdrop of decreased government enforcement,57
direct purchasers face new substantive and procedural hurdles,
increasing the need for indirect purchaser suits, particularly when it is
obvious that direct purchasers are not going to function as private
attorneys general.
A. The Anti-Enforcement Trend
1. Substantive Obstacles to Private Antitrust Enforcement
Where plaintiffs once prevailed merely by establishing that an
agreement fit into one of many categories deemed per se unreasona-
ble, the Court now requires more extensive evidence of anticompeti-
tive effect. Overturning a century-old precedent, Leegin v. PSKS58 is a
typical example of the Court's substantive shift from per se treatment
to "rule of reason" analysis.59 Such decisions rest on opinions of
" [r] espected economic analysts."60 Debating the merits of these deci-
sions is beyond the scope of this Note.61 These examples illustrate
57 Since the 1970s, despite a likely increase in antitrust violations, the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice has lost personnel and filed fewer cases. See
ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION 56, 61 (6th ed. 2010); see also ABA SEC-
TION OF ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 19-20 (1989) (noting that the Division cannot per-
form its core function); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE STATE OF FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST ENFORCEMENT-2001, 14-15 (calling for more federal antitrust enforcement
resources and declaring existing resources to be inadequate to accomplish its
charge).
58 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (over-
ruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911)).
59 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (applying rule of reason to vertical
maximum resale price maintenance); Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Sta-
tionery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 288 (1985) (applying rule of reason to group
boycott); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 368 (1967), overruled
by Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (applying rule of reason to all
vertical non-price restraints).
60 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882.
61 It is unclear if elevated standards were a legitimate response to a litigation
bonanza or an inappropriate response to increased meritorious litigation. Compare
Steven Salop & LawrenceJ. White, Commentary, 3 PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW
EVIDENCE, NEW LEARNING (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988) (noting that private suits
2012] 1719
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both a pervasive anti-enforcement trend making it more difficult for
plaintiffs to prevail absent expert economic testimony and an
increased willingness to "ramble through the economic wilds" courts
once feared.62
2. Procedural Changes Make Deterrence More Difficult
Procedural changes are the vanguard of a "stealth assault on anti-
trust enforcement."6 3 If plaintiffs survive general pleading standards,
which themselves have become more onerous,64 they may still be
denied standing for a variety of reasons. Associated General Contractors
v. California Carpenters65 (AGC) noted that the common law limited
the Clayton Act's broad language66 and identified a number of factors
relevant to standing including whether the violation caused the
alleged harm,67 whether this is the type of plaintiff and the kind of
injury addressed by antitrust laws, 68 the directness of the asserted
injury,69 whether there is a better-situated plaintiff to bring the suit,70
the amount of speculation necessary to calculate damages,7' judicial
manageability,72 the prospects of either complex apportionment or
duplicative recovery,73 and the chances of diluting the damage award
grew from the mid-1960s before peaking in 1977, while private actions decreased in
the 1980s), with PITOFSKY ET AL. supra note 577, at 63-64 (noting that until the 1960s
plaintiffs were rarely successful even when relying on estoppel from successful govern-
ment prosecutions).
62 United States v. Topco Assoc. Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 n.10 (1972).
63 See generally Bauer, supra note 16, at 441-42, 444-46 (discussing how an overly
expansive antitrust injury requirement is yet another sign of hostility to antitrust
enforcement, leading to under-deterrence).
64 See generally Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Twombly,
which requires plaintiffs to plead a plausible factual basis that is more substantial than
what was previously required to survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
12(b)(6), is particularly onerous for antitrust plaintiffs who are harmed by parties
who can quite easily hide the facts plaintiffs would need to meet the standard. Paral-
lel action and stray remarks to the press, which were found to be insufficient to
unlock discovery, are all plaintiffs can expect to gather before discovery in many cases.
Twombly itself was an antitrust case.
65 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
66 See id. at 534.
67 Id. at 537.
68 Id. at 538.
69 Id. at 540.
70 Id. at 542.
71 Id. at 544.
72 Id. at 543.
73 Id. at 544.
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through apportionment, thereby decreasing deterrence.74 Taken
together,
[A]ll of these "tests" . . . [limit] . .. the universe of would-be claim-
ants, by identifying the better (or best) claimants, and then elimi-
nating other potential plaintiffs who present the risk of duplicative
recovery, or for whom the fact or amount of damages may prove
unduly speculative, or where problems of proof may be particularly
complex.7 5
Antitrust injury and standing requirements add more weight to
the plaintiffs already heavy burden, making private enforcement even
less likely.7 6 In Illinois Brick, the Court recognized and quickly dis-
missed concerns that "direct purchasers sometimes may refrain from
bringing a treble-damages suit for fear of disrupting relations with
their suppliers."7 7 In light of the anti-enforcement trend, sometimes is
now more frequent. Assuming the harm done to business relation-
ships by suing remains constant, as the probability of success dimin-
ishes, so too does the likelihood that the cost of suing-in terms of
damaged relationships-will outweigh the projected benefit. Excep-
tions that were less necessary when Illinois Brick was decided are all the
more important now because the chance that no one will sue has
increased.
Moreover, it is unclear whether the assumption that direct pur-
chasers are superior enforcers is still valid,7 8 and it is clear that indi-
rect purchasers are more likely enforcers than previously thought.7 9
Thus, who should enforce is now a closer and more important ques-
tion, making a more nuanced approach that allows for more excep-
tions particularly appropriate. By accepting Illinois Brick as the default
rule, exceptions can be fashioned to both preserve the direct pur-
chaser's award in cases where the direct purchaser is appropriately
motivated and incentivize a "more remote party . . . to perform the
74 Id. at 545.
75 Bauer, supra note 16, at 442 (citations omitted).
76 Professor Bauer notes that in six of the seven cases involving antitrust injury to
reach the Supreme Court, the injury was insufficient to support the claim. The two
antitrust standing suits split evenly, with one granting and one denying standing. See
id. at 441 n.22.
77 Ill. Brick. Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) (emphasis added).
78 See supra note 52 (identifying academics on both sides of this debate).
79 See AMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 269 ("Indirect purchaser litigation under
state law has become increasingly common, especially since the mid-1990s.").
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office of a private attorney general" in the growing number of cases
where the direct purchaser is not so motivated.80
B. Duplicative Recovery is Caused by Illinois Brick
Justice Blackmun called the plaintiffs in Illinois Brick "victims of
an unhappy chronology."8 1 His words were as descriptive as they were
prophetic. In the wake of Illinois Brick, most states passed so-called
"Illinois Brick-repealer" statutes.82 Blackmun thought that the Court's
support for indirect purchaser standing would have been at least as
strong, "perhaps [even] unanimous," if Illinois Brick had come before
Hanover Shoe because "[t]he policy behind the Antitrust Acts and all
the signs point in that direction, and a conclusion in favor of indirect
purchasers who could demonstrate injury would almost be
compelled."83
California v. ARC America Corp. (ARC) 8 4 suggests that the Court
may now agree.85 In that case, the district court, affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit, dismissed the plaintiffs indirect purchaser claims
authorized under a state Illinois Bick-repealer statute, concluding that
the repealer statutes were preempted because they would frustrate the
policies announced in Illinois Brick.86 The Supreme Court reversed,
allowing states to authorize indirect purchaser suits, noting that fed-
eral laws were intended to supplement, not replace, state antitrust
laws.87 Generally, state laws are to be preempted when the law "stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress,"88 suggesting that if repealer statutes
frustrated Congress's purposes, they would fall. Then the Court
noted, "We construed [Clayton] § 4 as not authorizing indirect pur-
chasers to recover under federal law because that would be contrary to the
80 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 542 (1983).
81 111. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 765 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
82 See AMC Report, supra note 3, at 269 ("At the present, more than thirty-five
states [representing over seventy percent of the nation's population] permit indirect,
as well as direct, purchasers to sue for damages under state law.").
83 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 765 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
84 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
85 See generally Ronald W. Davis, Indirect Purchaser Litigation: ARC America's Chick-
ens Come Home to Roost on the Illinois Brick Wall, 65 ANTITRUsT L.J. 375, 394-95 (1997)
(noting that Illinois Brick was a deviation from traditional antitrust laws and that ARC
undermined Illinois Brick by conforming more consistently with those traditional anti-
trust principles).
86 ARC, 490 U.S. at 99.
87 See id. at 101-02.
88 Id. at 101 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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purposes of Congress."89 The Ninth Circuit correctly observed that like
federal indirect purchaser suits, state indirect purchaser suits would
(1) compel complicated passing-on and apportionment calculations,90
(2) subject defendants to multiple liability,91 and (3) dilute the incen-
tive for direct purchasers to sue.92 These are the same prudential rea-
sons, announced in Illinois Brick as congressional purposes, that
justified blocking indirect purchaser suits. To summarize, these state
laws authorize indirect purchaser suits, such suits raise prudential con-
cerns contrary to the purposes of Congress, and laws contrary to Con-
gress's purposes are preempted. Yet these laws were not.
In response to this logical convolution, the Court wrote that state
laws authorizing indirect purchaser suits are "consistent with the
broad purposes of the federal antitrust laws: deterring anticompetitive
conduct and ensuring the compensation of victims of that conduct."93
These very same "broad purposes" were subjugated to prudential con-
cerns in Illinois Brick, purportedly in accord with congressional intent.
Here, these same "broad purposes" now justify disregarding the exact
same prudential concerns to reach the opposite result: subjugating
prudential concerns in favor of compensation. The Court continued:
It is one thing to consider the congressional policies identified
in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe in defining what sort of recovery
federal antitrust law authorizes; it is something altogether different,
and in our view inappropriate, to consider them as defining what
federal law allows States to do under their own antitrust law.9 4
Recovery-the means by which compensation is achieved-was
clearly no match for prudential concerns in Congress: "We construed
89 Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
90 See id. at 103-04. Bolstering the Ninth Circuit's analysis, the Class Action Fair-
ness Act greatly increases the likelihood that that a large number of state indirect
purchaser claims will end up in federal court by decreasing the standards for diversity
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2006); AMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 269.
91 See In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d 1435, 1445 (9th Cir.
1987); see also ARC, 490 U.S. at 105. The Court responded by noting that nothing
prevents states from imposing liability "over and above that authorized by federal
law." Id. This argument fails because states did not want to create double liability. See
AMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 274 ("[A] number of states expressly instruct courts to
avoid duplicative damages; no state expressly affords duplicative damages."). Ironi-
cally, though no decision-maker wanted duplicative liability, the Court's decision
forced that result because states also sought compensation for all antitrust victims.
92 So long as the defendant cannot use defensive passing-on at the federal level,
dilution is not a concern. It was in this case because a combined pool of damages had
already been awarded. ARC, 490 U.S. at 105.
93 Id. at 102.
94 Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
2012] 1723
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
§ 4 as not authorizing indirect purchasers to recover under federal law
because that would be contrary to the purposes of Congress."95 Inex-
plicably, the Court then stated: "[N]othing in Illinois Brick suggests
that it would be contrary to congressional purposes for States to allow
indirect purchasers to recover under their own antitrust laws." 96 In
fact, Illinois Brick suggested the opposite: allowing indirect purchaser
suits was simply too high a price to pay for compensation given the
exact prudential concerns presented both in that case and here.
There are two ways to reconcile this confusion. One explanation
places state legislatures' decisions regarding the relative importance
of prudential concerns above Congress's decisions on the same point,
even when Congress is acting within its authority and definitively
chose to place those prudential concerns at the top of the policy heap.
This is clearly incompatible with the Supremacy Clause. The other
option is admitting that Illinois Brick got it wrong and that deterrence
and compensation truly are more important, according to Congress,
than prudential concerns. Logic notwithstanding, the Court chose
neither option, and far from ending this unhappy chronology, the
Court simply made it worse.
Duplicative liability is now allowed if it comes under state law but
not if it comes under federal law.97 Indeed, had Illinois Brick been
decided differently, repealer statutes would not have been necessary,
and the risk of duplicative liability could have been limited if not elim-
inated by joinder rules.98 In any event, ARC provides indirect pur-
chasers with Supreme Court precedent supporting the proposition
that risk of duplicative liability does not necessarily foreclose indirect
95 Id. (emphasis added).
96 Id.
97 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT ON REMEDIEs 2 (2004) ("[Illinois
Brick repealers are responsible for] creating the prospect of multiple litigation and
the possibility of duplicative exposure."); ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE STATE
OF FEDERAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT - 2004, 53 (same).
98 AMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 266, 274 ("[B]ecause indirect purchasers typi-
cally cannot join direct purchasers in pursuing remedies in federal court ... direct
and indirect purchasers have often brought multiple, duplicative lawsuits in federal
and state courts. . . . [T]he potential for duplicative recoveries remains a serious
concern as long as direct and indirect purchaser actions proceed without coordina-
tion in separate courts."); see Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737-38 (1977)
(suggesting that mandatory and permissive joinder could reduce if not eliminate the
prospect of duplicative liability). If anything, multi-district litigation makes federal
consolidation easier, adding strength to the argument that Illinois BHrick actually cre-
ates more duplicative liability than it prevents.
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purchaser recovery.99 Contrary to Illinois Brick, ARC elevated the
"broad purposes" of antitrust law, including compensation, above pru-
dential concerns. At a minimum, this suggests that the Court is will-
ing to entertain broader exceptions to Illinois Brick where
compensation would be drastically underserved, even if duplicative lia-
bility is a concern.
C. Calculating Diffculties and Judicial Economy
ARC also implicated the same apportionment challenges Illinois
Brick sought to avoid. Calculating the passed-on portion of an over-
charge was seen as "insurmountably" difficult, yet ARC approved state
laws explicitly requiring such calculations. Congress ensured that fed-
eral courts will be increasingly called upon to do these calculations
under the Class Action Fairness Act, 00 which grants federal jurisdic-
tion with minimal diversity in many class actions.10 1 Since ARC, the
apportionment-difficulty rationale has been substantially undermined.
The decision belies the Court's hesitancy in ranking it too high on the
list of policy priorities, especially as both experience and economic
theory have proven it largely overstated. 0 2 Nevertheless, Illinois Brick
has spared federal courts from a great deal of concededly difficult
apportionment issues, and the rationale still supports the indirect pur-
chaser rule. Indirect purchasers arguing for an exception thus are
unlikely to succeed if their damage theory depends on apportioning
an overcharge that was arguably passed-on. The case for an exception
even if apportionment is implicated could become much stronger if,
however, the plaintiffs show that they will simply end up litigating the
same issues in the same court under a state Illinois Brick-repealer stat-
ute and diversity jurisdiction.
99 See infra Part III.C (discussing various lower court requirements to assuage
fears of duplicative liability before granting an exception to Illinois Brick).
100 28 U.S.C. § 1711 et seq. (2006).
101 Id. (stating that classes of 100 members with at least $5 million in controversy
require minimal diversity only); see also AMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 269.
102 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 346k1 (discussing a number of relia-
ble methods for calculating indirect purchaser damages); Richman & Murray, supra
note 3, at 99 ("[S]tate courts have exhibited a capacity to handle suits from indirect
purchasers and to calculate pass-on damages under Illinois Brick repealer statutes
. . . ."); see also Paper Sys. Inc. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 281 F.3d 629, 633-34 (7th
Cir. 2002) (holding, per Judge Easterbrook, that courts are capable of apportioning
damages if need be); AMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 274 ("Witnesses argued that
recent advances in econometrics and other methodologies have made such assess-
ments somewhat more manageable. . . .").
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ARC and Illinois Brick combine to produce a solution that is both
unfair and wasteful: the latter case prevents victims from recovering
while the former allows duplicative adjudication of the same claims.103
Indirect purchaser litigation under state law is increasingly common,
and the cases are "frequently pursued separately rather than consoli-
dated with other actions in a federal court proceeding."1 0 4 To the
extent that this mitigates compensation concerns, it creates concerns
of duplicative litigation and liability. Direct purchasers prefer federal
court, where they can recover the full overcharge; indirect purchasers
prefer state court, which is their only option.105 Wasteful litigation is
bad for (almost) everyone, and efforts to ameliorate concerns of judi-
cial waste have had limited success. 0 6
D. Stare Decisis
Despite these concerns, Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick themselves
have been unequivocally reaffirmed. 07 Further, Illinois Brick is often
cited for the proposition that stare decisis is particularly important in
statutory construction. 08 Calls to overturn Illinois Brick will likely go
unanswered. By contrast, chipping away at the edges of the rule is far
more likely to produce results. For one thing, the very cases that cite
Illinois Brick as the standard for stare decisis in statutory construction
often note that this maxim is least compelling in antitrust law, which
has quasi-common law features due to the Sherman Act's broad lan-
guage. 09 Other commentators have noted the incongruity between
modern antitrust jurisprudence and Illinois Brick's categorical rule."10
Antitrust law generally,"' and standing analysis specifically,11 2 have
103 See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 739-41 (1977); supra note 99.
104 AMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 269.
105 Id.
106 See id. at 269-70 (identifying various ad hoc solutions to coordinate state and
federal actions).
107 See, e.g., Kansas v. UtiliCorp United Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 213 (1990).
108 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 918
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109 See, e.g., id. at 877 (majority opinion).
110 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 5, at 2, 17 ("[Slince Illinois Brick the Supreme
Court has developed a theory of antitrust standing which focuses on how remote a
victim is relative to the anticompetitive action.... Illinois Brick also could have been
seen as a per se application of AGC . ... This appears to be the position that Illinois
Brick now represents."); Richman & Murray, supra note 3, at 78.
111 See, e.g., Leegin, 551 U.S. at 895 (quoting Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433
U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977)).
112 See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 520 (1983).
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embraced individualized, case-by-case analyses to ensure that a rule is
not inadvertently applied inconsistently with the rule's policy justifica-
tions. Modem antitrust jurisprudence is increasingly influenced by
"[r]espected economic analysts,"" 3 and courts are increasingly willing
to conduct complex economic analysis. Illinois Brick's categorical
approach, founded more on aversion to economic complexity than
confidence that the rule promotes wise policy, 1 14 stands in stark con-
trast to this modern antirust landscape. Recognizing a default rule
that allows for exceptions in cases where the rule fails to promote
legitimate policies fits far more naturally into this landscape. Given
Illinois Brick's tenuous policy support, exceptions are particularly
appropriate. In short, stare decisis does nothing to bar chipping away
at the roughest edges of a bad rule.
E. Compensation Is Misaligned
Most commentators agree that compensation was largely aban-
doned as an antitrust goal in Illinois Brick." 5 By conceding that it was
"refusing to carry the compensation principle to its logical
extreme,"' 1 6 the Court was saying little more than that they would not
totally abandon compensation. Given the uncertainty in calculating
passed-on damages, the Court reasoned that it was not unfair to deny
compensation.' 1 7 Acknowledging that damage calculations may be
difficult, however, hardly justifies assuming as a matter of law that
damages are zero. The more meaningful point is that even if indirect
purchasers were allowed to sue, they would face such a difficult task
proving damages that few plaintiffs would ever prevail, and thus the
rule does little to diminish compensation.
Under this reasoning, allowing a windfall for direct purchasers is
superior to allowing indirect purchasers the opportunity to sue from
both a deterrence perspective (because indirect purchasers would
rarely sue, inadequately punishing violators) and a compensation per-
spective (because indirect purchasers would rarely collect, leaving the
113 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882.
114 The Court noted the risk of a poor fit: "We recognize that direct purchasers
sometimes may refrain from bringing a treble-damages suit for fear of disrupting rela-
tions with their suppliers." Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977).
115 See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 16, at 443 (noting that compensation is underserved
by the indirect purchaser rule); Richman & Murray, supra note 3, at 90-92 (titling a
section, "Abandoning Compensation"); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 20, at
605 (approving of this decision and arguing that antitrust laws should be neutral
towards compensation).
116 Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 746.
117 Id.
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difficult-to-prove damages in the hands of the violator rather than the
direct purchaser). Changes in class action rights, a review of state
court dockets, and a cursory examination of the modern economy
reveal that indirect purchaser suits are not as rare as Hanover Shoe sug-
gested, undercutting the first rationale.' 1 8 Illinois Brick falls under the
latter rationale. It did not claim that suits would be rare so much as it
claimed that collection would be rare because damages would be hard
to prove.' 19 If this is so, the direct purchaser's windfall is now justified
as part of a normatively superior compensation mechanism that only
rarely under-compensates an indirect purchaser who would have actu-
ally collected while more effectively depriving criminals of their ill-
gotten gains.
This compensation scenario inadequately accounts for a growing
number of real-life situations. First, it guarantees under-compensa-
tion for indirect purchasers in all cases. Even if collection rates are
low, especially for class action members who suffer minimal harm,
some indirect purchasers suffer substantial harm.120 Illinois Brick uni-
formly denies the latter group compensation along with the former.
Second, to the extent that parens patriae actions and diminished class
certification standards incentivize indirect purchaser suits where the
individual harm is less substantial, direct purchaser windfalls no
longer take the would-be retained fruits of illegal behavior from the
violator. Rather, the windfall overcompensates one victim while
another class of deserving, willing, and able litigants cries out for a
remedy. Finally, the need to consider indirect purchaser compensa-
tion is especially acute when direct purchasers are benefiting in some
way by not suing.121
While ARC may mitigate the harsh consequences of under-com-
pensation, state repealer statutes provide at best inconsistent, incom-
118 AMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 269 ("Indirect purchaser litigation under state
law has become increasingly common, especially since the mid-1990s."). Importantly,
"as multilevel supply chains become more the rule than the exception-and exposure
of indirect purchasers to passed-on antitrust injury grows accordingly-the indirect
purchaser rule increasingly operates to undermine compensation." Richman & Mur-
ray, supra note 3, at 91. As more layers are added to supply chains, indirect purchasers
incur larger individual injuries, as well.
119 Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.
120 Indirect purchaser is not synonymous with consumer; retailers, wholesalers, or
even higher echelons of the supply chain may be indirect purchasers of enormous
quantities, suffering equally enormous injuries.
121 Direct purchasers often have compelling reasons not to sue, which defendants
are aware of and can exploit. Cutting a troublesome wholesaler out of the supply
chain sends a signal to would-be plaintiffs that treble damage actions may not be
worth it.
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plete, and inefficient compensation. As much as thirty percent of the
nation lives in states without indirect purchaser remedies.122 Where
remedies are recognized, they are very likely to create duplicative liti-
gation and may lead to duplicative liability. Moreover, Congress
already created a nationwide compensatory regime under the Clayton
Act, and the concerns leading the Court to downplay the importance
of this policy are quickly vanishing.
Overall, Illinois Brick's policy rationales provide minimal support
for the indirect purchaser rule. To be certain, the rule does preserve
the direct purchaser's undiluted award, incentivizing private enforce-
ment. By contrast, though Illinois Brick prevents duplicative liability at
the federal level, it creates additional liability that would be avoided if
indirect purchasers could be joined in a single action. Similarly, Illi-
nois Brick avoids some of the complex apportionment calculations it
hoped to avoid but does not do so completely. Further, Illinois Brick
and ARC combine to waste judicial resources. Even the principles of
stare decisis no longer justify Illinois Brick to the extent they once did.
Finally, compensation, which was concededly neglected in Illinois
Brick, is even more underserved today than it was at Illinois Brick's
inception.
III. THE NEED FOR BROADER EXCEPTIONS
Despite this largely negative policy record, Illinois Brick is plausi-
bly defensible to the extent that it (1) avoids difficult damage appor-
tionment based on passing-on theories, (2) promotes deterrence by
preserving the damage award for the direct purchaser, and (3) dimin-
ishes the risk of duplicative liability (i.e., prevents it at the federal level
without simply pushing the risk to state courts). By every other policy
measure, denying recovery to indirect purchasers in federal court is
worse than granting it would have been. Recognizing these failings,
others have demanded: "Your Honor, Tear Down This Illinois Brick
Wall!"1 23 Rather than tearing down the wall, a more realistic
approach involves chipping away at it by expanding exceptions to
allow indirect purchasers to sue more frequently. By targeting situa-
tions where the policy weaknesses discussed above are most acute,
indirect purchasers can and should be successful in seeking recovery.
122 AMC REPORT, supra note 3, at 269.
123 Karon, supra note 7, at 1351. See also AMC REPORT, supra note 3 (calling for
repeal of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick with dissenters largely calling for preemption
of state repealer statutes); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 346i (critiquing the
rule); Blair & Harrison, supra note 5 (same); Harris & Sullivan, supra note 51 (same);
Richman & Murray, supra note 3 (same).
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Exceptions can be granted without running afoul of precedent if
(1) complicated apportionment is unnecessary, which may be the case
even if the direct and indirect purchasers recover so long as they are
not both claiming the same overcharge damages; or (2) the direct
purchaser is barred from re-litigation or is unlikely to sue. If either of
these conditions is satisfied, dilution is not a concern and duplicative
recovery is either impossible or unlikely. Scholarly disagreement not-
withstanding, the Supreme Court announced that condition one is
non-negotiable. Some courts misapply the condition, however, failing
to recognize exceptions even where damages do not implicate forbid-
den apportionment. Other courts are unduly restrictive regarding the
second condition, granting exceptions only where the direct pur-
chaser is legally prohibited from suing. Given Illinois Brick's policy
record, clinging tightly to the rule does a disservice to the very policies
the rule was designed to serve. This Part identifies the most promi-
nent ways in which indirect purchasers can satisfy these conditions.
A. The "Cost-Plus" Exception
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick recognized two exceptions explic-
itly, each allowing indirect purchaser suits only where calculating the
passed-on portion of an overcharge is unnecessary.124 The first excep-
tion applies where the indirect purchaser commits in advance of the
overcharge to purchase a fixed quantity of goods at cost, plus a prede-
termined markup (hence the name, "cost plus"). Here, apportion-
ment is unnecessary and duplicative recovery is impossible because
the direct purchaser is unharmed; it sells the same quantity at the
same profit margin as before the overcharge. 25 In Kansas v. UtiliCorp
United Inc.,126 the Supreme Court made clear that this exception only
applies if quantity is fixed. It is not enough to show that the direct
purchaser raised its price, dollar-for-dollar, in response to an over-
charge from its supplier. Holding that consumers of natural gas are
not "proper plaintiff[s] ... when the lawsuit already includes as plain-
tiffs those public utilities who paid the inflated prices upon direct
purchase . .. and who subsequently passed on most or all of the price
increase,"1 27 the Court reaffirmed Illinois Brick128 and showed that
exceptions would fail if they require difficult apportionment.
124 See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 n.16.
125 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1 346e.
126 497 U.S. 199 (1990).
127 Id. at 206.
128 Id. at 204 ("[Wle hold that only the utility has the cause of action because it
alone has suffered injury within the meaning of [Clayton] § 4.").
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Plaintiffs argued that apportionment was unnecessary because
the direct purchasers passed on the entire overcharge dollar-for-dollar
by increasing price. The direct purchaser's decision to increase price
does not mean it suffered no harm, however. At increased prices,
consumers demand less, decreasing the utilities' sales volume. 12 9 To
calculate the direct purchaser's harm, the parties would have to deter-
mine how the overcharge affected the direct purchaser's pricing deci-
sion and how much of the overcharge damages were retained as
opposed to passed on. This is the exact calculation (apportionment
of the damages when an overcharge increases the direct purchaser's
input costs, causing the direct purchaser to raise its price to indirect
purchasers) that Illinois Brick concluded was insurmountably diffi-
cult.1 30 Similarly, apportionment would make direct purchasers less
likely to sue in the future, which Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe forbid.
Granting an indirect purchaser award without diluting the direct pur-
chaser's award entails duplicative liability, another of Illinois Brick's
concerns. Thus, UtiliCorp implicated the exact policy concerns under-
lying the indirect purchaser rule, and "[a]lthough the rationales of
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick may not apply with equal force in all
instances, [the Court held that] it [is] inconsistent with precedent and
imprudent in any event to create an exception" here.' 3 '
UtiliCorp was a weak case for creating an exception, and its hold-
ing is not surprising. This in no way suggests that the Court would not
create exceptions where the rationales of Hanover Shoe and Illinois
Brick apply with less force. To the contrary, "[i]f [the Court] were
convinced that indirect suits would secure [vigorous enforcement of
antitrust laws] better in cases involving utilities, the argument to inter-
pret § 4 to create the exception sought by the petitioners might be
stronger." 32 The plaintiffs attempted to make the strongest argu-
ment an indirect purchaser can muster in favor of an exception, show-
129 Id. at 218.
130 Id. at 209.
131 Id. at 214, 216.
132 Id. This counsels against over-reading the Court's statement that, "[We do not
intend to] 'carve out exceptions to the [direct purchaser] rule . . . ' [by] classifying
various market situations according to the amount of pass-on likely to be involved
. . . ." Rather, the Court does not intend to do so only when this "would inject the
same 'massive evidence and complicated theories'" as Hanover Shoe sought to avoid.
Id. at 216-17 (quoting Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 744-45 (1977)). Ability
to pass an overcharge on is only one of many factors demonstrating that a direct
purchaser is unlikely to sue. A host of other factors make an indirect purchaser
unlikely to sue, and so long as these are not premised on the ability to pass on an
overcharge, they will be considered, just as the Court considered the plaintiffs argu-
ment here.
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ing that the direct purchaser is unlikely to sue. Plaintiffs, however, did
not convince the Court on "this critical part of the case."133 First and
most obviously, the direct purchasers were already involved in the suit,
and utilities historically have been diligent enforcers. They were also
absorbing some of the overcharge, giving ample incentive to sue
regardless of damages. Finally, there was no evidence that the regula-
tors would have required disbursement of the punitive (trebled) por-
tion of any award, making a possible judgment quite enticing even if
no harm occurred. 134
UtiliCorp is the only Supreme Court case to address Illinois Brick
exceptions, and it limited the cost-plus exception-the only exception
at issue in that case-to situations in which "market forces are sus-
pended" by operation of a cost-plus price and fixed quantity con-
tract.135  More broadly, the decision clarifies the type of
apportionment to be avoided: upstream action causing an overcharge
leading to increased input costs that a direct purchaser partially passes
on. Critically, UtiliCorp opens the door for broader exceptions where
deterrence would be better served by indirect purchaser suits, pro-
vided theories of passing-on are not the basis for this assertion. For
example, if the direct purchaser is barred by the statute of limitations
from suing, indirect purchasers have a colorable argument to bring
the treble damage action. Since the direct purchaser cannot sue,
there is no need to worry about diluting its damage award; apportion-
ment will be unnecessary as only downstream consumers have a right
to collect; and without the indirect purchaser's suit, deterrence will be
underserved. Given that the policy support for Illinois Brick is tenuous
at best, it is better to liberally deviate from the rule rather than rigidly
applying the rule unless it is legally certain to be wrong. There is little
reason to cling so tightly to a weakly supported rule.
B. The Indirect Purchaser "Control Exception"
Illinois Brick identified "another example where market forces
might be suspended,"136 making apportionment of the overcharge
133 Id. at 214 (noting that even though regulators may require the utilities to give
a portion of any damage award they receive to customers, the utility has ample reason
to sue).
134 Id.
135 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, INDIRECT PURCHASER LITIGATION HANDBOOK 16
(2007) [hereinafter HANDBOOK] (concluding that very few plaintiffs utilize the excep-
tion because the bar is so high); see also Illinois v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 935
F.2d 1469, 1478-79 (7th Cir. 1991) (ruling that the cost-plus exception was not satis-
fied even though plaintiffs could demonstrate complete passing-on).
136 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1977).
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unnecessary. If the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its cus-
tomers (indirect purchasers) then "the direct purchaser and the indi-
rect purchaser are a single entity that bears the entire overcharge."13 7
This situation satisfies the conditions for finding an exception. First,
the indirect purchaser's damage theory does not depend on claiming
a portion of an overcharge passed through the direct purchaser to the
indirect purchaser. Instead, the indirect purchaser claims the entire
overcharge on behalf of the single entity.13 8 As a result, the damage
award is preserved as an undiluted incentive in the hands of the most
likely enforcer (in this case, whichever part of the single entity the
entity itself chooses). Finally, resjudicata prevents duplicative recovery
by barring all but the first suit brought by the single entity.139
A variation of this exception which crystallizes the exact policy
concerns to be avoided arises when the direct purchaser is an
employee, purchasing agent, or service provider for the indirect pur-
chaser. 140 Here, the apportionment problem in UtiliCorp (an
upstream overcharge causing the direct purchaser to pass on a por-
tion of its increased costs) is not implicated. As an easy example, con-
sider an employee who directly purchases overcharged tools and is
later reimbursed fully by his employer, the indirect purchaser. The
employee, unlike the utility, does not require additional compensa-
tion because the tools he bought are more expensive; he expects dol-
lar-for-dollar reimbursement, thus passing the entire overcharge to
the employer and retaining no independent harm. Where the utility
loses profits if it does not extract more money from the indirect pur-
chaser (which causes additional harm from decreased sales volume),
employees, purchasing agents, and financial service providers do not
137 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1 346f.
138 In other contexts, litigation over how much control is necessary to constitute a
single entity is more common. Here, this is less important because even without com-
plete ownership, the apportionment can be worked out internally.
139 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 346f (calling the prospect of a sec-
ond suit unlikely and unproblematic; resjudicata will bar the second suit); see alsoJ.F.
Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1543-44 (3d Cir. 1990) (recogniz-
ing that the "single entity" exception applies with equal force to sister-corporations).
140 See XIJOSEPH P. BAUER, Kinter Federal Antitrust Law §78.8, at 79-81 (1998); see
also Doe v. Ariz. Hosp. & Healthcare Ass'n, 2009 WL 1423378, at *8 (D. Ariz. 2009)
(holding that temporary nurses working for an agency were direct "victims" of the
agreement by hospitals to depress wages because nurses worked in and were some-
times paid directly by hospitals); In re Mercedes-Benz Antitrust Litig., 157 F. Supp. 2d
355, 366 (D.N.J. 2001) (holding that leasing vehicle through a credit corporation did
not make purchasers of automobiles "indirect purchasers"); In re Toilet Seat Antitrust
Litig., 1977 WL 1453 at *2 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (holding that using the services of
purchasing agent did not make the principal an indirect purchaser).
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see an input price increase because of an overcharge in the item to be
purchased. For the latter group, as prices rise, demand for their ser-
vices may become more acute (benefiting them), or decreased
demand for the product could decrease demand for their services
(harming them). Even if there is harm, however, it is not based on
passing an overcharge, but rather it is based on the decreased spend-
ing power of the indirect purchaser (who, for example, no longer can
afford to pay its employee at all), a wholly different and separable
injury from the one suffered by way of the original overcharge itself.
The direct purchaser's damages may be difficult to calculate, but
they are not difficult to calculate in the way Illinois Brick forbids.' 4 1
Dilution and duplicative recovery are impossible since the damages
are wholly separable. Finally, deterrence might be totally undermined
without this exception. Direct purchasers could be denied standing
because of the tenuousness of their injury, in which case there would
be no private enforcer.142 In this situation, the case for an exception
is particularly strong.
C. The Coconspirator Exception
A more contentious exception applies when the direct purchaser
is complicit with the upstream antitrust violator. Under this "cocon-
spirator" exception "the indirect purchaser might still be allowed to
maintain an action-in part because the first transaction should not
be treated as a true sale and thus the plaintiff could reasonably be
considered to be the 'direct purchaser,' and also in part because these
situations are less likely to implicate the policies underlying Illinois
Brick."143 Without an exception, Illinois Brick would be absurd as
applied. The rule would entrust the only private enforcement action
to one of the very parties needing to be deterred. Moreover, violators
141 McCarthy v. Recordex Serv., Inc., 80 F.3d 842, 852-54 (3d Cir. 1996), presents
a close case between the employee example and the utility example. Attorneys pur-
chased overcharged copying services which they billed to clients. Holding that the
attorneys were neither employees nor purchasing agents, but rather independent con-
tractor-agents, the court refused to apply the "agency exception." As with the utility
and unlike the typical purchasing agent, the attorneys' input costs increased, directly
prompting an increase in prices for the services they provide. Thus, demand for their
services decreased as a direct result of their passing on an overcharge. Apportioning
the attorney's harm from the client's portion involves the exact calculations UtiliCorp,
following Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, condemned.
142 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 346j (arguing that AGC might block
standing). Note that even if the direct purchaser has standing, it is legally precluded
from suing for the overcharge because it did not pay any portion of the overcharge.
143 See BAUER, supra note 140, at 85.
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could insulate themselves from liability by paying-off direct purchasers
who participate in the conspiracy and punishing those who do not,
leaving indirect purchasers uncompensated and antitrust violators
undeterred.
Arising in a variety of factual scenarios, the coconspirator excep-
tion has received wide support1" with inconsistent application. In the
easiest cases, the direct purchaser conspires with the upstream pur-
chaser to fix resale prices. Essentially, the indirect purchaser is not
really an indirect purchaser at all, and apportionment is wholly
avoided if Illinois Brick "allocates to the first non-conspirator in the
distribution chain the right to collect 100% of the damages" for an
overcharge. 45 There is no concern of the direct purchaser subse-
quently suing after the damages have been so allocated, and "if a con-
spirator defects and sues its former comrade, that snitch would come
to own the right to damages, but [the direct purchaser co-conspira-
tors] did not change sides and align themselves as plaintiffs. Thus our
[indirect purchasers] are entitled to collect damages .... ."146 Some
courts categorically declare Illinois Brick inapplicable where vertical
conspiracies are alleged, which goes further than the previous example
where the direct purchasers were named co-defendants.147 Courts are
confident that the direct purchaser will not sue based on its alleged
involvement in the scheme. More importantly, a direct purchaser
... challenging resale price maintenance imposed on itself would
not base its damages on an "overcharge" at all. Its action is not
based on a higher product price to itself, but rather on the con-
straint on its resale price; its damages would be for lost profits
resulting from the reduced volume of sales.... Lost profits dam-
144 See, e.g., HANDBOOK, supra note 135, at 21, 23 (noting that at least seven circuits
have explicitly recognized it and none have rejected it). The First Circuit has recog-
nized the exception since the Handbook was published. See In re New Motor Vehicles
Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 533 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2008).
145 Paper Sys. Inc. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 281 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2002).
146 Id.
147 See Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing
Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980)) (holding
that where consumers changed their theory of liability from a wholesale price fixing
scheme to a horizontal conspiracy among retailers, Illinois Brick is no bar, and even if
a vertical conspiracy were involved, Illinois Brick would be no bar); Lowell v. Am. Cyan-
amid Co., 177 F.3d 1228, 1230 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that Illinois Brick does not
apply to vertical price fixing cases where the direct purchaser is alleged to have
participated).
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ages for the intermediary and overcharge damages for the con-
sumer are not in any way duplicative. 148
Consequently, the direct purchaser is unlikely to sue, and if the
scheme is actually a vertical price fix, the direct purchaser is also una-
ble to sue for overcharge damages. 149 Apportionment, dilution, and
duplicative recovery are all avoided, and deterrence would be com-
pletely undermined without the exception.
Courts are concerned, however, that what the indirect purchaser
alleges to be a vertical conspiracy may ultimately be provable as a hori-
zontal scheme above the direct purchaser's level, in which case the
indirect purchaser's initial recovery would have no estoppel effect on
the direct purchaser, leading to a risk of duplicative liability.150 There
are a wide variety of solutions to this problem, and courts should allow
indirect purchaser plaintiffs to assert any of them to show that the
direct purchaser is either unlikely or unable to sue, rather than rely-
ing only on estoppel produced byjoinder. The latter approach often
does far more to ensure that no one will sue than to ensure that two
people will not sue, a result completely at odds with the intent behind
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick. Instead, courts should liberally grant
the coconspirator exception where the plaintiffs can show, by any
method, that direct purchaser suits are either unlikely or legally
foreclosed. 151
One way to ensure that the upstream defendant will not be sub-
ject to multiple liability is to simply require the indirect purchaser to
148 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1 346h; see also Lowell, 177 F.3d at 1231
(quoting the quoted passage to support its holding).
149 See also BAUER, supra note 140, at 80 ("[T]he indirect purchaser limitation only
applies to overcharges which might be passed on through the chain of distribution.
Thus, it has been held that the doctrine does not foreclose an action for discrimina-
tory pricing by the seller to plaintiffs supplier, where no overcharge was involved.").
150 See In re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litig., 730 F.2d 528, 531 (8th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting the coconspirator exception unless the direct purchaser is joined as a co-
defendant, especially where defendant was accused of horizontal and vertical
restraints). But see Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d at 1212 (holding that where the direct
purchaser settled on one theory of damages, the indirect purchasers are allowed to
recover on an alternate theory of damages that would not duplicate the direct pur-
chaser's settlement award).
151 Thoroughly considering exceptions does nothing to dilute direct purchaser
awards. Where the direct purchaser has already sued, the indirect purchaser will obvi-
ously fail to convince a court that the direct purchaser is unlikely to sue, unless the
suit was initiated purely to defeat an exception. If the indirect purchaser sues first
and prevails, future direct purchasers are, if anything, more motivated to sue quickly
to avoid losing a treble damage award to an indirect purchaser.
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sue the direct purchaser instead of the upstream violator. 152 Rather
than formulating this as mandatory, this should be one of many per-
missible ways in which an indirect purchaser can satisfy a court that
Illinois Brick is inapplicable. If it is mandatory, the violator can insu-
late itself from liability by creating an underfunded shell subsidiary to
function as the direct purchaser which will ultimately be judgment
proof. Alternately, the direct purchaser may simply be judgment
proof, or the plaintiff may have evidence that makes it easier to attack
one potential defendant rather than another. Artificially limiting
exceptions allows violators to evade liability and unnecessarily limits
indirect purchasers' ability to recover.
Other courts require that the coconspirator be joined before rec-
ognizing the exception.' 53 While joining the direct purchaser as a
codefendant is one way to ensure that duplicative liability will not
ensue, it is by no means the only way, making categorical rejection of
the coconspirator exception absent direct purchaser joinder unduly
restrictive and dangerous. 154 Applying this condition rigidly allows
direct purchasers to escape liability. Consider the case of Midwest
Milk,155 where the court was properly concerned about duplicative lia-
bility given allegations of both vertical and horizontal conspiracies-
the context in which a direct purchaser-coconspirator is most likely to
subsequently sue the upstream violator. The direct purchaser was not
named as a codefendant, so the court refused to grant an excep-
152 Mid-west Paper Prods. Co. v. Cont'l Grp., Inc. 596 F.2d 573, 588 (3d Cir. 1979)
(recognizing that a control exception may exist in some contexts, but in this case,
since the coconspirator-subsidiary could be sued directly, there was no possibility of
avoiding liability by creation of a subsidiary).
153 See Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 932 (3d Cir. 1986)
(citing numerous cases in which Illinois Brick had barred recovery even where vertical
conspiracies were alleged absent joinder); see also In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian
Exp. Antitrust Litig., 533 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 2008) (same); Paper Sys. Inc. v. Nippon
Paper Indus. Co., 281 F.3d 629, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying the coconspirator
exception where the direct purchaser and upstream suppliers were named as co-
defendants); In re Midwest Milk Litig., 730 F.2d 528, 531 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing In re
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petrol. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d 1335,
1342 (9th Cir. 1982)) (requiring that direct purchasers be named as codefendants to
avoid duplicative liability).
154 See, e.g., Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1171 n.4 (8th Cir.
1998). This case involved hundreds of direct purchaser-venues scattered across the
nation. Id. at 1168-69. Joining these scattered parties as codefendants would have
been incredibly difficult, adding substantially to indirect purchaser litigation costs
and probably foreclosing suit by the most likely enforcer. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 3, 1 346h. This case has been widely criticized for a variety of reasons,
making it a prototypical example of when not to adhere to rigid rules.
155 730 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1984).
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tion.'5 6 Plaintiffs countered that the statute of limitations had run,
making it impossible for direct purchasers to sue and therefore
unnecessary that they be joined.'5 7 The court rejected this claim with-
out explanation, leaving no private enforcers.15 8
Consequently, future indirect purchasers who patiently endure
antitrust harm while the supposedly more effective enforcer fails to
act cannot sue even the day before the statute of limitations runs so
long as there is any possibility that a horizontal conspiracy may subse-
quently (in the next day?) be alleged. This would presumably hold
even if the indirect purchaser files suit on condition that direct pur-
chaser suits filed before the statute of limitations has run must be
allowed to proceed first. The result is that no one is left to sue, pro-
moting the exact opposite result Illinois Brick ostensibly intended. 59
Another error made by courts that rigidly apply Illinois Brick
occurs when a direct and indirect purchaser both seek recovery for
separable damages. In Link and Howard Hess Dental Laboratories, Inc. v.
Dentsply International, Inc.,o60 for example, the courts could have
assuaged concerns about duplicative liability by identifying the exact
damages each party sought rather than requiring joinder, which
served no additional purpose.' 6' In both cases, the manufacturer
"forced" an exclusive dealing arrangement on the wholesaler. Indi-
rect purchaser claims based on an overcharge resulting from the man-
ufacturer's ability to increase the price for its own products to the
wholesalers should be dismissed. The indirect purchasers also lost the
ability to purchase the products that would have been sold by the
manufacturer's competitors to the wholesalers absent the agreement.
Calculating the harm caused by this lost opportunity does not appor-
tion passed-on overcharges, and thus is not barred by Illinois Brick.162
Consequently, even if the indirect purchaser recovered for these dam-
ages and the direct purchaser subsequently recovered by showing it
lost profits as a result of lost sales volume in more cheaply acquired
parts, the recovery would not be duplicative, as the harm was suffered
156 Id. at 531.
157 Id. at 532.
158 Id.
159 In Midwest Milk, there were other plaintiffs, but that is no guarantee that the
portion of the damages attributable to the direct purchaser and dismissed plaintiff
would ever be recovered. See id. at 533.
160 424 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2005).
161 See id. at 381; Link v. Mercedes-Benz N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 929 (3d Cir.
1986).
162 No other parties at the manufacturer's level were mentioned. Howard Hess
Dental, 424 F.3d at 381; Link, 788 F.2d at 929.
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by both, not passed from one to the next.163 Areeda and Hovenkamp
discuss this error in Howard Hess Dental in great detail:
The court also concluded that the [indirect purchasers] could
not recover damages for lost profits that they might have made had
they been able to sell the [products] of rivals but for the exclusive
dealing. ... [T] his confuses two different situations . . . . In this
case . . . the impact of the exclusive dealing was to deny the plain-
tiffs the right to sell the products of the defendant's rivals. This loss in
no way relates to the overcharge damages and would not constitute
duplicative recovery.
[I]n [Howard Hess Dental] the claim was exclusive dealing....
Any overcharge measure of damages would not provide any compensation at
all for the loss of. . . sales of the rivals' products. 1 6 4
Applied in every case, denial of indirect purchaser recovery could
immunize violators from liability for at least a portion of the damages
they cause. Requiring joinder of the coconspirator exacerbates this
possibility, immunizing some defendants unnecessarily who arrange
vertical conspiracies and provide direct purchasers with sufficient ben-
efit from the conspiracy (by giving favorable deals or rebates, for
example) to convince them not to sue.165
These misapplications of Illinois Brick flow from treating Illinois
Brick as a standing rule, which leads some commentators to errone-
ously see damage theories as distinctions without a difference.166 Illi-
nois Brick is a theory of damages, not a standing rule,167 and if indirect
purchasers are categorically denied standing rather than possibly pre-
163 See Link, 788 F.2d at 932 n.12.
164 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1 346h (second emphasis added).
165 Lowell v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 177 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 1999), correctly recog-
nizes this and asserts that in vertical conspiracy cases the direct purchaser is never
entitled to a portion of the overcharge, and the coconspirator exception should
therefore apply regardless of joinder. Id. at 1231. Midwest Milk required joinder
given its concern that the agreement may have actually been horizontal, in which case
the direct purchaser would have been overcharged. See Midwest Milk, 730 F.2d at 531.
The court in Link should have applied Lowell's rule but instead applied Midwest Milk's
even though there was no risk of re-characterizing the agreement as horizontal. Link,
788 F.2d at 933.
166 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 5, at 20-21 (noting thatJudge Posner sees the
rule as a theory of damages whereas Judge O'Scannlain sees the rule as a standing
limitation).
167 Illinois Brick explicitly stated that "direct purchasers [are] injured to the full
extent of the overcharge paid by them." Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746
(1977). AGC is the appropriate standing test, and it is quite different from Illinois
Brick. Moreover, if Illinois Brick were a standing rule, it would not allow suits for
injunctions, but being a damage theory, such suits are approved in every circuit to
address the issue. See Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note 3, 1 346d.
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vailing based on AGC-which is the general antitrust standing test-
or prevailing where their damage theory is distinct from the direct
purchaser's, then an indirect purchaser may be dismissed where the
indirect purchaser has suffered damages that will never be remedied,
even if the direct purchaser sues.16 8
Yet another possible mechanism to assuage concerns that grant-
ing indirect purchaser remedies will lead to duplicative liability if the
direct purchaser subsequently sues is in pari delicto-an equitable
defense against parties who attempt to sue for damages that they had
a role in causing.169 If an indirect purchaser seeking overcharge dam-
ages can allege sufficient facts to show that the direct purchaser will be
barred from suing the same defendant due to its "involve [ment] in a
conspiracy at a requisite level," a court may be satisfied that even if the
direct purchaser sues, the defendant has an adequate defense against
duplicative liability.1 70 In Howard Hess Dental v. Dentsply, the court
notes that "every Court of Appeals that has decided the issue" has rec-
ognized the doctrine.1 7 1 The court hesitated to fully support the doc-
trine, however, noting that when the Supreme Court was faced with a
choice between deterrence and equities, it sided with deterrence. 1 72
Counter-intuitively, in pari delicto is a pro-deterrent defense in this
context. Unless defendants can use the defense as a shield against
future duplicative liability, courts in the first case which has already
been brought will be forced to dismiss in favor of a future action
which may never come. Courts should not fear awarding indirect pur-
chaser damages on the assumption that the defense will prevent dupli-
cative liability: if a court awards damages on this basis, while not
bound by the decision, future courts would almost certainly respect
168 See Seth E. Miller, Comment, Seeing Over the Brick Wall: Limiting the Illinois
Brick Indirect Purchaser Rule and Looking at Antitrust Standing in Campos v. Tick-
etmaster Corp. Through a New Lens, 32 FIA. ST. U. L. REV. 197, 221-22 (2004) (criticiz-
ing Posner as providing "a detour around the indirect purchaser doctrine" that
"require [s] courts to take part in a similar, and sometimes difficult, damage calcula-
tion"). Like Blair & Harrison, Miller is pointing out the inconsistencies in Illinois
Brick, a critique which is well-taken. So long as Illinois Brick remains good law, how-
ever, it is critical that courts honestly apply the law to minimize the damage it does to
antitrust victims.
169 See, e.g., Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 424 F.3d 363,
381 n.17, 382 (3d Cir. 2005). Other courts have termed this the "complete involve-
ment defenses." See Wallach v. Eaton Corp., 2011 WL 4527313 (D. Del. 2011) (deny-
ing defendant's motion to dismiss despite plaintiffs position as indirect purchaser,
recognizing the complete involvement defense).
170 Howard Hess Dental, 424 F.3d at 382.
171 Id. (noting that at least four circuits have recognized the defense).
172 Id. at 382-83.
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that decision by denying direct purchaser recovery. With deterrence
already assured by the indirect purchaser's suit, the only concern is
equities, and since in pari delicto operated to subject the defendant to
liability in the first place, it would be extremely inequitable to deny
the defense and allow duplicative recovery. This has an additional
deterrent benefit; it encourages direct purchasers to quickly bring
enforcement actions against upstream violators. Whoever sues first
has deterrence on their side, and the Court has already announced
that in pari delicto will not bar suits that decrease deterrence; thus if
the direct purchaser hopes to avoid an in pari delicto defense against its
claim, the smart move is to sue early, which may be the only way to
avoid the defense with dirty hands. If direct purchasers wait, however,
and an indirect purchaser recovers, then equities and deterrence fall
against the late-arriving direct purchaser.173
Ultimately, it is difficult to argue that Illinois Brick, a rule designed
to promote deterrence, would truly countenance placing the only
deterrent cause of action in the hands of a coconspirator. Courts rec-
ognize this in principle, but they refuse to grant the exception if there
is a slight chance of duplicative liability, even if there is far greater
chance of no liability.174 They are correct to seek assurances that the
alleged coconspirator is truly involved, rather than a slow-to-enforce
victim. But there is no need to require absolute certainty. Even if the
direct purchaser does choose to sue-which is unlikely given the high
probability that doing so will expose its own misdeeds-the results of
duplicative liability are minimal. The direct purchaser's incentive to
enforce has, if anything, increased, and apportionment need not be
done (the indirect purchaser can collect the entire award). The only
remaining concern is duplicative liability, which can be completely
avoided using any of the mechanisms discussed. If any of these apply,
the coconspirator exception should be granted. Even if none does, a
small chance of duplicative liability should not outweigh a far greater
chance of no liability.
Some courts dangerously suggest that refusing to grant indirect
purchaser exceptions absent legal certainty of avoiding duplicative lia-
bility actually promotes deterrence. Howard Hess Dental provides a
clear example:
Illinois Brick's third policy concern-risk of inefficient enforce-
ment . . .- cuts against the unlimited exception [where an excep-
tion is granted even if the direct purchaser is not legally barred
from bringing subsequent action].. . . Under the unlimited excep-
173 See id. at 383.
174 Midwest Milk is perhaps the clearest example of this.
2012] 1741
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tion . . . their recovery would be diluted and their incentive to sue
would decrease.175
It is unclear why this would necessarily dilute the direct pur-
chaser's incentive to sue. It is just as likely that whoever recovers
would receive the full award to avoid apportionment concerns. Even
assuming that the indirect purchaser's award would be carved out of
the direct purchaser's award, the court's argument rests on the unsup-
portable assumption that the direct purchaser, a coconspirator in an
illegal act, is the most efficient enforcer.176 Common sense should
suffice to disprove that notion: an illegal gambler makes for an unreli-
able legal enforcer against his bookmaker. Once the plaintiff shows
that the direct purchasers are sufficiently involved to make them either
unlikely or unable to sue, using the mechanisms here or others that
may persuade the court, 177 there is little reason to fear duplicative
liability. A slight chance of multiple liability pales in comparison to
the alternative: no liability. In ARC,178 the Court held that creating a
slight risk of duplicative liability in order to promote deterrence and
compensation was consistent with Congress's broader purposes and
did nothing to undermine congressional intent. The exact same argu-
ment supports broad recognition of the coconspirator exception.
D. The Defendant Control Exception
Where the defendant owns or controls the direct purchaser, 179
exceptions are even more necessary: " [T] o conclude otherwise would
175 Howard Hess Dental, 424 F.3d at 381.
176 If we assume Illinois Brick was generally correct, then direct purchasers might
have, for example, a thirty percent chance of suing while indirect purchasers have
only a fifteen percent chance. If the direct purchaser's desire to hide its role in the
conspiracy decreases its chance of suing to ten percent (which seems high, but any
number below fifteen percent proves the point), discussion of diluting that award
becomes irrelevant, and greater harm is done to enforcement by denying the indirect
purchaser a remedy than by diluting the direct purchaser's award.
177 Since duplicative liability is the defendant's concern, another plausible possi-
bility involves allowing the indirect purchaser to sue if it alleges the direct purchaser
was a coconspirator and requiring the defendant to join the direct purchaser as a
necessary party.
178 See supra Part II.B.
179 This is a different version of the control exception discussed above where the
direct and indirect purchaser form a single entity. See supra Part III.B (discussing an
exception where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its "customers"); see
also In re Chicken Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d 228, 229 (5th Cir. 1982) (recognizing the
exception); In re Mid-At. Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (D. Md.
1981) (recognizing that it is the "unanimous view" of lower courts to grant this excep-
tion); In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13, 18-19 (3d Cir. 1978) (recogniz-
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effectively insulate the parent from liability through the ... creation
of, and sales to, a subsidiary."' 80 Many of the factors supporting a
coconspirator exception militate in favor of this form of the control
exception, most notably, the small risk of duplicative liability offset by
the larger risk of no liability. Some courts, most prominently the
Ninth Circuit, have recognized that a slight risk of duplicative recov-
ery is a small price to pay for better enforcement. After authorizing
indirect purchaser recovery, the court wrote:
[There is] some small chance that such a subsidiary or division
might wish to sue... .The parent might be under government pres-
sure or discover that the conspiracy is not sufficiently profitable;
and if a subsidiary has outside shareholders, a derivative suit might
be a possibility. . . . [Miultiple liability might lurk.
[T]he chance of a direct-purchaser suit is so small, [that] the
correspondingly small risk of multiple recovery does not disturb us.
This is especially so when our only alternative is to effectively immunize the
transactions here from private antitrust liability.i8
Every rationale for Illinois Brick vanishes if the direct purchaser is
sufficiently owned or controlled by the violator: apportionment is
irrelevant when direct purchasers are unwilling to sue (or if courts
accept a small risk of duplicative liability);' 82 dilution is irrelevant for
the same reasons discussed above;1' deterrence will be underserved
unless the only likely plaintiffs, indirect purchasers, are allowed to sue;
and compensation to indirect purchasers is underserved. By contrast,
the only adverse consequence of granting an indirect award is creating
a slight risk of duplicative liability, and Royal Printing explains why this
is acceptable, making the control exception fertile ground for
expansion.
Yet many courts reach the opposite conclusion, narrowing the
exception based on misstated policy implications. Howard Hess Dental
is again a good example. The plaintiffs argued that the defendant
ing the exception); Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Cont'1 Grp., Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 578
n.8 (3d Cir. 1979) (same); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1 346f (citing Royal
Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1980)) (same).
180 BAUER, supra note 140, at 80 (citing Sugar Industries, 579 F.2d at 16-19).
181 Royal Printing, 621 F.2d at 326 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
182 As Royal Printing noted, the indirect purchaser "cannot sue . .. only for the
portion of the overcharge that was passed on to it.... The only alternatives are to
allow [it] to sue-. . . for the entire amount of the overcharge . .. or not to allow [it]
to sue. [The latter] would be intolerable." Id. at 327.
183 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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exerted "virtual control over its ... dealers." 84 In response, the court
states, "We have applied the control exception only when the initial
seller owned the direct purchaser."1 8 5 This cuts the exception in half
by removing the word "control" from the equation.18 6 Before
rejecting the exception based purely on plaintiffs lack of ownership,
the court recognizes that other decisions, such as Jewish Hospital Ass'n
of Louisville, Kentucky, Inc. v. Stewart Mechanical Enterprises Inc.,18 7 have
expanded the exception "beyond a parent-subsidiary relationship," to
cases where there is a "'functional economic or other unity between
the direct purchaser and . . . the defendant . . . [such] that there
effectively has been only one sale.'" 8 8 The court then lists as possible
signs of control, "interlocking directorates, minority stock ownership,
loan agreements that subject the wholesalers to manufacturers' oper-
ating control, [or] trust agreements.'""8 9
In applying this standard, the court states, "Nothing about [the
defendant's] 'control' over its dealers would prevent the dealers from
suing ... thus creating a isk of duplicative liability[.]" 190 As with the
coconspirator exception, Howard Hess Dental follows many courts in
requiring plaintiffs to show that the direct purchaser is prevented from
suing to completely eliminate even a risk of duplicative liability. 91
The court offers no explanation for rejecting the logic of Royal Print-
ing. Further, the court assumes that apportionment, rather than
duplicative liability, would be the only way to allow indirect purchaser
recovery, which is not the case.19 2 Worst of all, the court states,
"[P]ermitting Plaintiffs to sue for damages could potentially lead to
184 Howard Hess Dental Lab., Inc. v. Dentsply Int'l. Inc., 424 F.3d 363, 371 (3d
Cir. 2005).
185 Id. (citing Sugar Industries, 579 F.2d at 18-19, n.8).
186 But see Fisher v. Wattles, 639 F. Supp. 7, 9 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (arguing that the
case cited in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 n.16 (1977) to support the
control exception, Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969), involved con-
trol by way of majority stock ownership, thus limiting the "control exception" to this
context).
187 628 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1980).
188 Howard Hess Dental, 424 F.3d at 372 (quoting Jewish Hosp., 628 F.2d at 975 (6th
Cir. 1980)).
189 Id. (alteration in original) (citing In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs
Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1997)).
190 Id. (emphases added).
191 The court was correct in this case because the direct purchasers were already
involved in the litigation, making this a poor case for an exception. Nevertheless, the
court's overly-broad language provides dangerous precedent.
192 Compare Howard Hess Dental, 424 F.3d at 372, with supra note 181 (recognizing
that apportionment can and probably should be avoided, accepting duplicative recov-
ery instead).
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inefficient enforcement . . . because . . . recovery . . . would be
diluted . . . thereby decreasing the dealers' incentive to sue."1 3 As
with the coconspirator exception, this ignores the obvious. When an
upstream defendant effectively controls the direct purchaser, the indi-
rect purchaser is a far more likely enforcer, and if this is true, then
preserving the award for the direct purchaser reduces enforcement by
eliminating a more likely enforcer. Far worse than dilution, misappli-
cation of Illinois Brick risks complete immunization. If there is a high
probability, rather than a legal certainty, that Illinois Brick might in
fact, if not in law, immunize violators, the purposes of antitrust law
align to compel an exception.
Illinois Brick recognized an ownership or control exception, and
cases like Howard Hess Dental, Fisher, and Jewish Hospital essentially con-
dense the exception to cover ownership. The control necessary to
completely undermine Illinois Brick can be exerted in many ways other
than ownership, however. Royal Printing recognized that " [e]ven if
the pricing decisions of such a subsidiary . . . are necessarily deter-
mined by market forces, its litigation decisions will usually be subject to
parental control."'94 When litigation decisions are controlled, the
defendant is effectively immunized. In other cases, control over price
is enough to justify an exception, as in Howard Hess Dental:
[T] he relevant control here is the control of resale prices, not con-
trol of the intermediaries' other operations. . . . [C]ontrol could
mean something other than ownership. The issue is computation
of pass-on, which is not necessary when the upstream firm controls
the intermediaries' prices.' 95
In other words, if prices are sufficiently controlled, the indirect
purchaser's damage theory may escape the reach of Illinois Brick.
Thus, control justifying an exception appears in varied contexts and is
not easily amenable to categorical rules. Applying rigid restrictions
before granting exceptions may cause courts to miss which control is
really relevant to the plaintiffs claim. Courts should instead focus on
the policy implications of allowing the exception rather than attempt-
ing to fit unique cases into prearranged categories.
In Kloth v. Microsoft Corp.,'96 for example, the court stated, "This
exception ... appl [ies] only when the ... defendant has either 'func-
tional unity' with the [direct purchasers] or sufficient ownership ...
193 Howard Hess Dental, 424 F.3d at 372.
194 Royal Printing Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1980)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
195 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1 346h.
196 444 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2006).
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or control . .. to set prices[.]"' 9 7 Royal Printing notes the importance
of control over litigation decisions, which is the most relevant control
when deciding who the superior enforcer is. Litigation decisions, in
turn, can be controlled by many factors other than ownership or those
listed in Howard Hess Dental, 9 s including "fear of disrupting relations
with their suppliers."199
De facto control over litigation decisions does just as much to
undermine Illinois Brick as does parental control over the same deci-
sions. The existence of violator control over the relevant decisions
undermines the rule; it makes no difference how the violator exerts
that control. If suing a supplier is tantamount to economic suicide,
the direct purchaser cannot and should not be trusted with the sole
private cause of action, and if common sense does not compel this
conclusion, the absence of direct purchasers in the Microsoft antitrust
actions throughout the last decade provides ample evidence. 2 0 0 Thus,
Kloth counsels violators to use strong-arm tactics and economic pres-
sure points against direct purchasers to force them not to sue. This
creates de facto immunity because this kind of control is sufficient to
persuade a direct purchaser not to sue but insufficient under Kloth to
create an exception.
Preventing a small risk of duplicative liability20 does not justify
creating a large risk of immunity. Throughout the coconspirator and
control exception cases, the true concern appears to be that courts
will misjudge when the exceptions should apply, and their response is
simply to hold that it virtually never applies. Here is where these
courts err. The consequences of misjudgment, measured against the
purposes of antitrust law, pale in comparison to the consequences of
leaving the only action to a party who will never sue. If the latter
197 Id. at 321.
198 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
199 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977) (citing In reW. Liquid Asphalt
Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198 (9th Cir. 1973)).
200 See Patterson, supra note 4, 378-82 (2001) ("Microsoft's direct purchasers
(e.g., IBM, Compaq, CompUSA, and Dell) are conspicuously absent from court dock-
ets.. .. Microsoft exerts incredible control over Windows' use.... [D]irect purchas-
ers are unlikely to bring antitrust damage suits because no commercially viable
alternative to the Windows OS exist[s].... [Companies] like Compaq and IBM, who
rely on Windows . . . acquiesce to Microsoft's strong-arm tactics because they fear
suing their sole source for operating systems. ... [C]ompanies that have chosen not
to acquiesce have incurred financial injuries.").
201 This assumes one would choose duplicative liability over apportionment.
Apportionment would probably be superior to allowing violators to effectively immu-
nize themselves, though this is a closer call given the dilutive effect of apportionment
on incentives to sue.
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occurs, there is a guarantee of under-enforcement and under-com-
pensation-undermining both of the twin aims of antitrust law. As it
stands now, a miniscule risk of a lesser concern trumps a far greater
risk of a far greater concern. If ARC made clear that risk of duplica-
tive liability is an acceptable cost to promote these twin aims in some
circumstances, surely this situation is just such a circumstance.
Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors,202 offers support for
expanding exceptions in a new way. The court writes, "Indirect pur-
chasers can sue for damages if there is no realistic possibility that the
direct purchaser will sue." 20 3 A no-realistic-possibility standard would
bring back the deterrent effect Illinois Brick originally sought to pro-
duce, recognizing that direct purchasers are not always the most likely
enforcers, even if they are not legally precluded from suing. It
remains an open question how far courts may stray from the legally-
prohibited standard when applying the no-realistic-possibility stan-
dard,204 but this language at least opens the door for indirect pur-
chaser suits in cases where there would otherwise be very little hope of
deterrence or compensation by any other means. Defining the outer
boundaries of this approach can be left for another time, but for now,
there is a great need for this kind of broad, flexible language allowing
courts the freedom to ensure that Illinois Brick does not stand as an
obstacle to its own purposes.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust laws were created for two basic purposes: to deter antitrust
violations and to compensate antitrust victims. Illinois Brick denied
compensation to indirect purchasers ostensibly in an effort (1) to pro-
mote deterrence by preserving an undiluted damage award for the
most likely enforcer, (2) to avoid complicating already complex anti-
trust litigation with insurmountably difficult apportionment calcula-
tions, and (3) to avoid duplicative liability. The rule announced in
Illinois Brick was flawed from the outset by essentially rejecting one of
the twin aims of antitrust law. As for the other, though it claimed to
202 322 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 940 (2003).
203 Id. at 1145-46 (emphasis added).
204 Id. at 1146. Under the facts of Freeman, the exception could have been
granted based on control of the board of directors, essentially an ownership issue. In
Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized the validity of Freeman but denied the exception because "appellants failed to
allege any facts establishing that there is no realistic possibility [the direct purchaser]
will not sue." Id. at 1050. See also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1 346f ("[T]he
exception that the Ninth Circuit purported to recognize is not yet one acknowledged
by the Supreme Court.").
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promote this goal, it could have done more by allowing asymmetrical
theories of passed on overcharge damages, preserving the direct pur-
chaser's incentive while allowing indirect purchaser suits if those
plaintiffs were willing to take on complex litigation. It is questionable
whether Illinois Brick was even correct in declaring direct purchasers
to be more likely enforcers in the general case. Subsequent develop-
ments weakened this already unstable foundation, cast doubt on the
validity of fears of complex apportionment, and showed that the con-
cerns Illinois Brick sought to avoid are both overstated and exacer-
bated by the rule itself.
Left with at best weak policy support, lower courts should listen
attentively to indirect purchasers seeking exceptions to the rule in
cases where the rule's policy support evaporates. Instead, many courts
apply rigid conditions that allow exceptions only if plaintiffs happen
to meet certain criteria that are poor metrics of the rule's success in
promoting its policy goals. Ultimately, a rule justified in part by its
deterrent merits often bars the most efficient enforcer from suing,
unless that enforcer can prove to a legal certainty that it is the only
enforcer, and in some cases even that is not enough. Fortunately,
some courts have taken a more flexible approach, recognizing that
the policy concerns raised in Illinois Brick can be addressed by a variety
of mechanisms that do not lend themselves to rigid categorization or
application. Continuing to chip away at the Illinois Brick wall when
plaintiffs can show-not necessarily to a legal certainty but to a high
probability-that the rule's own policies are substantially undermined
is increasingly important as deterrence and compensation are increas-
ingly undermined in other ways.
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